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Abstract 
While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a 
strategy in the hopes of stabilizing and extending their tenure in power, this does not mean 
it is always effective. Indeed, an extant literature presents strong evidence that the opening 
of the pursuit of power to electoral competition can make authoritarianism vulnerable. 
Unless it is mediated by other factors, democratic emulation by authoritarian incumbents 
cannot simultaneously both stabilize their rule and make it more vulnerable to democratic 
transitions. These two literatures leave us with a set of contradictory generalizations.  Some 
scholars argue that reiterated multiparty competitive elections present a gradual path from 
authoritarianism to democracy.  Can they at the same time be a source of authoritarian 
stability?  In this paper we seek to resolve this paradox by employing a unique combination 
of event history modeling to assess how experiences with multiparty elections influence 
patterns of authoritarian survival and transition in 108 countries from 1946-2010. Our 
results suggest that while authoritarian regimes face increasing odds of failure during the 
first three iterated multiparty and competitive election cycles, subsequent iterated cycles are 
far less dangerous to their survival.  Given that few authoritarian regimes survive past three 
elections, these findings should be seen as more supportive of the democratization by 
elections thesis than democratic emulation as a way to enhance authoritarian survival. 
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Introduction 
The explosion of regime change since the mid-1970s commonly referred to as the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991) ironically has made the classification of regimes a moving 
target for scholars of comparative politics.  As countries moved away from conventional 
authoritarianism, opening up to multiparty elections, the role and significance of elections in our 
understanding of regimes has shifted radically.  Rather than the sine qua non of democracy, 
elections are now at best merely a necessary condition.  The convening of contested multiparty 
elections ceased to be understood as incompatible with the persistence of authoritarianism. 
An early literature on frozen transitions, diminished subtypes of democracy, and regimes 
that fell between the standard cold war non-democratic regime types (for a summary see Collier 
and Levitsky 1997) has given way to a literature on “electoral” or “competitive authoritarianism” 
in which authoritarian incumbents are able to syncretize democratic institutions and use them to 
their own ends (e.g. Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006, 2013).  A large 
number of observers have even argued that by decreasing the institutional differences between 
dictatorship and democracy, this half-way house has made authoritarianism more durable (for a 
summary see Ghandi and Lust-Okar 2009). 
The latter part of the third wave also challenged our assumptions about how countries 
traverse the path from authoritarianism to democracy.  An influential early literature understood 
transition as a punctuated moment in which authoritarianism gave way to democracy via the 
convoking of democratic “founding” elections (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 
1996; Przeworski 1991).  If conditions were propitious, this transition could in turn lead to the 
consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 
1992).   
As the scope of the third wave expanded geographically, this neat disjunctural model ran 
into trouble. There was an element of ambiguity about democratization in some postcommunist 
countries where old elites managed the exit from communism, justifying their continuity in 
power as democratic reform.  Some of these countries eventually achieved minimal 
democratization, but only after a second round of popular mobilization kicked out these 
refurbished authoritarian incumbents (Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Other postcommunist states, 
despite such mobilizations, continue to fall short of democracy (Kalandadze and Ornstein 2009).  
In Africa, the process of regime change has been highly uncertain and protracted.  Democratic 
openings with multiparty elections rarely provided neat cut points between authoritarianism and 
democracy. Sometimes the process resulted in somewhat liberalized dictatorships, and 
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sometimes democracy came to fruition in a slower more evolutionary fashion where elections 
led to incremental improvements in democratic quality (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; 
Lindberg 2006).1 Today, we continue to find dictatorial African incumbents such as Togo’s 
Faure Gnassingbé, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, Djibouti’s lsmaïl Omar Guelleh, and Zimbabwe’s 
Robert Mugabe still comfortably in power despite repeated multiparty elections.  
These two literatures leave us with a set of contradictory generalizations.  Some scholars 
argue that reiterated multiparty competitive elections present a gradual path from 
authoritarianism to democracy.  Can they at the same time be a source of authoritarian stability?  
In this paper we seek to resolve this paradox.  We begin by reviewing the literatures on 
authoritarian stability by democratic emulation and democratization via elections.  We then 
conduct a series of tests of the competing theories using event history models. Our analysis 
assesses how experiences with multiparty elections influence patterns of authoritarian survival 
and transition from 1946-2010. We draw on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project to 
develop new measures of multiparty and competitive elections, as well as distinct electoral 
authoritarian regime types (Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b).  We find that the competing 
democratization-by-elections and stabilization-by-elections theories each have their own merits. 
Specifically, our results suggest that while authoritarian regimes face increasing odds of failure 
during the first three iterated multiparty and competitive elections, subsequent iterated cycles are 
far less dangerous to their survival. However, given that few authoritarian regimes survive past 
three elections, these findings should be seen as more supportive of the democratization by 
elections thesis than democratic emulation as a way to enhance authoritarian survival. 
 
I. Neo-Authoritarian Stability by Democratic Emulation? 
Democracy has the great advantage of creating legitimacy through a combination of procedural 
and charismatic elements.  It holds regular elections that choose representatives of the people to 
legislatures who create policies under the rule of law.  At the same time, the creation of 
democracy involves the devolution of sovereignty from rulers on the basis of traditional and 
religious, or other substantive claims, to the consent of the ruled transformed into the “people.”  
This elevation of common subjects into citizens with a voice in whom exercises authority over 
them represents the permanent embedding of a charismatic element into leadership selection 
under democracy.  This combination of elements helps to explain why among modern forms of 
																																								 																				
1 The punctuated model of direct authoritarian transition to democracy did not make sense in other periods and 
places as well.  This point is demonstrated adeptly by Capoccia and Ziblatt’s (2010) framework for historical 
democratization in Europe.  They do so by using a historical institutionalist framework to analyze multiple critical 
junctures by which democracy is constructed in a piecemeal fashion. 
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rule democracy is perhaps the most adept at securing legitimate rule and restoring it when it 
comes under threat. 
Thus, it is no wonder that authoritarian regimes often attempt to emulate democracies in 
order to legitimize and prolong their tenure. It should be recalled that the first modern 
dictatorship, that of Louis Napoleon in France, relied heavily on plebiscitary elections.  The first 
set of modern dictatorships to systematically attempt an emulation of this set of procedures were 
Soviet-type regimes.  They created legislatures elected by universal suffrage and advanced the 
claim that they represented a form of “people’s democracy” superior to that of heretofore 
existing “bourgeois” democracies.  These assertions were ultimately ineffectual in as much as the 
real system of power in Soviet-type systems was exercised outside the bounds of legislatures.  
Restrictions on candidacy, the lack of party sub-system autonomy, the lack of real competition, 
the less than secret nature of the ballot, and the rubber-stamping of policies prepared in advance 
by the ruling party rendered such claims unsubstantiatable over time (Kaya and Bernhard 2013). 
Things became more complex with the onset of the third wave and especially after the 
end of the Cold War.  On the one hand, non-democratic forms of rule were increasingly seen as 
illegitimate by domestic populations. On the other hand, countries dependent on trade and aid 
from the west faced increasing external pressures to democratize. Scholars note how existing 
forms of authoritarianism began to liberalize their regimes, including the incorporation of 
electoral and representative elements, to shore up their power.  Further, a large number of 
purported democrats, quite often former authoritarian incumbents, attempted to control 
pressures to democratize by introducing democratic elements meant to manage such pressure 
without fully submitting their hold on power to the uncertainty inherent in democracy (Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Schedler 2013).  
Faced with these developments, the discipline either thought that some transitions were 
more protracted or that the resulting regimes were hybrids that combined elements of 
democracy and dictatorship.  Most often, such half-way house regimes were labeled as deficient 
subtypes of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997).  But as these regimes persisted and 
seemingly demonstrated a durability in the face of democratic challenges, there came a creeping 
realization that we were observing a new phenomenon: authoritarian regimes that emulate 
elements of democracy in their quest for survival.  Since that realization, the discipline has 
increasingly focused on new forms of “electoral” and “competitive” authoritarianism (Schedler 
2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). These regimes are not caught in limbo between democracy and 
authoritarianism, but rather are a new sub-type of authoritarianism.  
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Among the most elaborate treatments, Schedler’s (2009) exploration of why 
authoritarian regimes pursue a strategy of democratic emulation finds a dialogic relationship 
between the risk posed to authoritarian incumbents by electoral contestation and their desire to 
survive in the face of global pressures for democratization.  To the extent that elections are 
perceived as fairly contested, authoritarian incumbents receive a legitimacy boost.  Too much 
repression of the opposition can undermine the legitimacy of the elections, and potentially the 
regime as well, or alienate key constituencies within the authoritarian elite.  Yet, uncertainty over 
the outcome of contested elections introduces a greater chance of losing power. Thus the key 
problem for authoritarian incumbents is to increase competitiveness in a way that maximizes 
enhanced legitimacy yet minimizes the prospects of losing elections. 
A number of other authors have also looked at ways in which democratic emulation can 
enhance the durability of authoritarianism.  Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that the 
existence of “nominally democratic” partisan legislatures extends the durability of authoritarian 
regimes by expanding the social basis of support for dictatorship through patronage and policy 
concessions.  Such institutions, they maintain, give autocrats an advantage in heading off the 
threat of rebellion from outside the narrow ruling group of the regime.   On the basis of a 
regression that predicts the optimal number of parties for survival based on threats to the 
regime, they argue that the institutionalization of authoritarian legislatures can enhance the 
chances of survival.  They show that regimes that allow too few parties have poor survival 
prospects, while those that over institutionalize (i.e. have more parties than are predicted 
necessary) survive longer. For example, multipartism enhances the survival times of regimes 
predicted to be institutionalized with no-party or one party (10.06>8.79>5.28 years). Still, not all 
of their evidence shows that democratic emulation pays off for authoritarian incumbents. One-
party dictatorships in general have greater mean survival times than either multiparty or no-party 
dictatorships (9.80>8.19>4.33).  Thus while their results are suggestive, they do not 
unequivocally support the contention that partisan legislatures enhance the survival of 
authoritarian rule.2  
Brownlee (2007) takes a more measured approach on the impact of elections, observing 
that they are neither “an unwitting step to full democratization” nor do they “automatically 
protect rulers by reducing international pressure or corralling the opposition” (9).  He argues 
																																								 																				
2 It is unclear how Gandhi’s (2008) expansion of their argument pertains to this literature.  She defines 
authoritarianism on the basis of rule without competitive elections.  She focuses on the effects of legislatures and 
elections on authoritarian survival, arguing that they have coalitional cooperation and opposition cooptation effects.  
She is unable to statistically substantiate that these authoritarian institutions enhance the survival of dictatorship.  
Examination of her case list of authoritarian regimes and the cases covered in Levitsky and Way’s (2010) discussion 
of competitive authoritarianism does not show substantial overlap between the two.  So it seems that her work on 
definitional criteria leaves out the cases that we find most interesting substantively. 
	
	
7	
elections reveal information about the balance of power between authoritarian factions, and the 
authoritarian regime and its incumbents, rather than drive regime outcomes.  In a regression 
analysis of the termination of authoritarian regimes from 1975-2000 in which he pits antecedent 
regime type against elections, he finds that elections have a positive coefficient but are not 
significant (31).  Like Geddes (2003), whose data he uses, he finds that single party 
authoritarianism is the most durable whereas military regimes are most likely to fail.  Ultimately 
he argues that institutionalized single party rule leads to durable authoritarianism because of its 
ability to promote elite unity and isolate opposition with or without elections.  Here he echoes 
the arguments of a rich vein of studies (Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater 2008; Smith 2005). 
Lust (2009) is more nuanced in her approach.  While she gives credence to other 
research showing that elections offer pathways out of competitive forms of authoritarianism, she 
argues that in more “hegemonic” authoritarian regimes, elections have a stabilizing effect.  This 
occurs because elections allow the ruling party to more effectively divvy up spoils among its 
factions.  Ultimately in such regimes, she sees elections as inconsequential to the threats that 
mass action could pose to the authoritarian incumbent, and illustrates how elections rarely figure 
in mass protest, when it breaks out, in hegemonic authoritarian regimes.  
Svolik (2012) makes a kindred argument.  He shows that democratic emulation is useful 
to authoritarian power where it helps to maintain the coherence of the regime coalition in the 
face of potential popular challenges (also see Boix and Svolik 2013).  He focuses on control of 
legislatures, which he shows leads to a lower hazard of regime collapse.  While he does not 
address the question of elections, he implicitly raises the ability of the regime to manipulate the 
outcomes of elections in order to control the composition of the legislation.  His findings are 
thus consistent with the proposition that dominant/hegemonic party authoritarianism is more 
stable than competitive authoritarianism (Svolik 2012, 190).  Similarly, Wright and Escribà-Folch 
(2012) show that the existence of authoritarian legislatures fortifies authoritarian regimes, but in 
an interesting nuance that the number of parties has an undermining effect. 
Another group of authors is more explicit about how elections help authoritarian leaders 
keep control.  They argue that competitive elections need not threaten authoritarian regimes if 
there are sufficient clientelistic resources on hand to determine election outcomes.  Greene 
(2007, 2010) shows how the politicization of state resources produces a reciprocity between 
dominant parties and voters, such that they can win elections without resorting to massive 
manipulation or repression.  Blaydes (2010) not only argues that competitive elections help to 
determine who benefits from the system of patrimonial distributional conflicts, but stresses how 
elections themselves help to maintain authoritarianism by providing cover for corrupt practices 
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and ease international pressures for regime change.  Magaloni (2008) focuses on the role that 
elections and political parties play in forging “credible commitments” between factions in the 
authoritarian elite by establishing regularized mechanisms for the distribution of spoils, thus 
increasing regime solidarity and survival.  While all of the authors discussed above note that 
competitive elections within an authoritarian context are not without their risks, the novelty of 
their arguments lies in their focus on how contestation can produce stability. 
 
II. Elections as Democratizing Mechanisms 
If the literature on democratic emulation brought an end to teleological interpretations of 
authoritarian liberalization and the convoking of multiparty elections, a second literature on 
democratization via elections undermined the uniform punctuated model where founding 
elections marked a discrete democratic transition, followed by consolidation or eventual failure.  
Lindberg (2006, 2009) most prominently argues that contested elections are not only a feature of 
democracy, but can serve as a mechanism for democratization within authoritarian regimes.  
Electoral contestation becomes a learning process, he argues, for both mass publics and elites.  
Using a sample based on the third wave in Africa, he shows that reiterated multiparty elections 
lead to an improvement in the democratic qualities of states.   
In response to Lindberg’s findings, scholars questioned whether this phenomenon was 
widespread or confined to third wave Africa.  Parallel to his research, events in postcommunist 
Europe also drew scholars’ focus on authoritarian elections as a triggering mechanism for 
democratization.  A string of Color Revolutions led to regime change in a series of states which 
had failed to attain minimal levels of democracy in the period 1989-91.3  Here the mechanisms 
specified have been somewhat different.  Several authors have looked at the Color Revolutions 
as provoked by a conscious process of international diffusion whereby the same set of tactics 
(e.g. poll monitoring, civil society mobilization, unified oppositional electoral coalitions, etc.) 
have been successfully employed (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; McFaul 2002).  
Tucker (2007) has paid somewhat more attention to the role of electoral fraud by incumbents in 
creating junctures that focus discontent and provoke collective action to an extent not seen 
during times of “normal” politics.  While the spectacular and riveting nature of such protest 
events cannot be denied, some observers have pointed to the temporary nature of the changes 
they have induced (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Kaya and Bernhard 2013). 
																																								 																				
3 Incumbents were successfully removed in Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia.  In a 
number of other countries electoral protest did not achieve this level of success (Belarus, Russia, Armenia, 
Moldova).  Some observers include a number of other protest movements outside of the postcommunist region as 
kindred events (i.e., Lebanon, Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Myanmar). 
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Lindberg’s original findings on Africa have been subjected to additional testing and the 
robustness of his findings have been generally confirmed, though with caveats (Rakner and van 
de Walle 2009; Morse 2015).  Attempts to duplicate his findings in other regions have been less 
successful.  McCoy and Hartlin (2009) have found little evidence of the democratizing effects of 
elections in Latin America.  Kaya and Bernhard (2013) found for the postcommunist countries 
that elections themselves do not matter, but that the relative power balance between the state 
and contesting oppositional forces at electoral junctures is much more important to 
democratizing outcomes.  And while she does not perform regression analysis, Lust (2009) 
makes a strong qualitative case against thinking that elections function in the Middle East like 
they do in Africa. 
A number of studies have also examined this question on a global level for longer time 
frames and have found evidence that the democratizing effect of elections are not merely a case 
of African exceptionalism.  Teorell and Hadenius (2009) examined a global sample and found a 
modest impact.  In a follow-up study, Brownlee (2009) provides evidence that authoritarian 
regimes that permit competitive multiparty elections are more likely to become democratic when 
they fail compared to other forms of authoritarianism.  However, he finds that, in general, they 
are no more likely to fail.  Howard and Roessler (2006) examine the conditions under which 
authoritarian elections are likely to lead to regime liberalization.  Their findings, while they do 
not explicitly consider full democratization, are congruent with the literature on the Color 
Revolutions.  Liberalization is more likely when there is social mobilization prior to elections and 
the political opposition presents a united front in the electoral campaign. 
Miller (2015) in a sample that includes both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries finds 
that electoral competition has a robust impact on both democratic transition and the subsequent 
survival of democracy.  His sample includes competitive regimes from Western Europe and 
North America which had not yet extended universal suffrage, thus the scope conditions for his 
findings are somewhat different than studies motivated by the competitive authoritarianism of 
the most recent period.  Knutsen and Nygård (2015) find that “semi-democratic” regimes are 
more likely to perish than democracies or autocracies, even controlling for past instability.  
However, their tests do not differentiate which forms of democratic emulation per se lead to 
their frailty.  Edgell et al. (2015) look at the general impact of competitive multi-party elections 
on democratic quality for the period 1900-2010 and tease out several important time period and 
regional effects.  While they find that the democratizing effect of elections hold over the sample 
as a whole, the effect is concentrated in the period of the third wave (1974-2010) and most 
strongly in Africa and the postcommunist countries. 
	
	
10	
III. The Boring of Hard Boards: Does Multiparty 
Competition Speed the End of Authoritarianism? 
While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a 
strategy in the hopes of stabilizing and extending their tenure in power, this does not mean it is 
always effective.  Unless it is mediated by other factors, democratic emulation by authoritarian 
incumbents cannot simultaneously both stabilize their rule and make it more vulnerable to 
democratic transitions. Therefore, if we are to reconcile the extant literatures, perhaps we need 
to first adjust how we conceptualize the experience of contested elections within authoritarian 
regimes.  
In surveying the literatures above, there is sufficient reason to doubt the argument that 
elections are an effective mechanism for authoritarian survival. Much of the literature on the 
mechanisms behind neo-authoritarian stability draws on cases like Mexico (Greene 2007; 
Magaloni 2008), Egypt (Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007), and Indonesia (Slater 2008; Smith 2007), 
all three of which have strong records of authoritarian stability.  Thus, it is hard to argue that 
competitive authoritarian elections in the end provided the kind of insulation that made them 
poor candidates for democratization.  Such authors always note the contingent nature of the 
hypothesized relationship between democratic emulation and authoritarian stability.  The 
problem of regime survival is a dilemma that plagues dictators to a much greater degree than it 
ever enters into the considerations of contemporary democratic politicians (Svolik 2012). 
Further the findings produced by Lindberg (2006, 2009), Teorell and Hadenius (2009) 
and Edgell et al. (2015) tell us that it is not the mere existence of competitive authoritarianism 
that undermines regimes, but that its persistence stimulates democratization.  It is the reiteration 
of contested multiparty elections that leads to the supplanting of authoritarianism with 
democracy.  This would mean that democratic emulation incrementally sows the seeds of its 
own demise.   
It is possible that democratic emulation by authoritarian regimes is a two edged sword. 
The effects could vary according to the timing or the nature of the electoral process itself.  With 
regards to the former, Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (forthcoming) highlight the proximity to 
elections.  Specifically, they find that elections open up windows in which the risk of 
authoritarian regime failure is higher, and that this window contracts during the inter-election 
period.  This is to some extent congruent with the findings of Howard and Roessler (2006) on 
the potential for liberalizing electoral outcomes and Tucker’s (2007) insights on how elections 
open opportunities to solve collective action problems for the camp of opposition. 
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What are we to make of the conflicting claims of Lindberg (2006, 2009) and Brownlee 
(2009)?  The former claims that the experience of multiparty elections can lead to authoritarian 
erosion and democratization in as few as four uninterrupted election cycles.  The latter holds 
that while electoral authoritarian regimes tend to produce democracies after breakdown, they are 
no more prone to breakdown than other authoritarian sub-types. This would suggest that 
multiparty elections prepare societies and elites for democracy, but some other intervening force 
is necessary to demolish the prevailing authoritarian regime before democratization can occur. 
Does the antecedent authoritarian regime stand as a barrier preventing the experience of 
multiparty elections from taking root as a means to the alternation in power inherent in 
democracy?  Do elections only matter when authoritarianism collapses? 
However, one might argue that Brownlee (2009) is measuring something different from 
Lindberg (2006, 2009).  Brownlee employs a regime typology, coding electoral authoritarianism 
based on de jure competition between multiple parties and then further disaggregating this into 
competitive and hegemonic electoral regimes.  His assessment of the impact of electoral 
authoritarianism on regime breakdown is based upon the mere presence of multiparty elections, 
which ignores the number of iterated multiparty elections that have been held within these regimes. As 
a result, the impact of successive uninterrupted rounds of multiparty elections remains untested. 
The electoral authoritarian categories contain regimes with various multiparty electoral 
experiences. This can be especially problematic for cases that are right censored, i.e. do not 
experience a transition prior to the end of the coding period and may have only recently come 
into existence.    
We take a somewhat different approach.  First and foremost, we are interested in 
different effects over time.  Accepting the notion that the convoking of elections by 
authoritarian regimes is fraught with danger for the initiators, we are more interested in the 
effects of reiterated sequences of elections.  In this we focus on the institutionalization of elections as 
a feature of new forms of electoral authoritarianism.  This grows out of the finding that the 
impact of elections on democratic quality (Lindberg 2009; Edgell et al. 2015) diminishes with 
reiteration.  We believe that this potentially means that opening to competitive elections is 
dangerous in the short-run, but that some authoritarian regimes are capable of navigating the 
trade-offs between the potential for loss of power and the enhanced legitimacy that electoral 
competition brings.  Thus we theorize that past a certain inflection point the continuation of 
electoral competition by authoritarian regimes represents a form of successful adaptation where 
the destabilizing effect of elections diminishes.  Thus, we expect authoritarian regimes to be 
most vulnerable to suicide by competition early on in reiterated electoral sequences. Should we 
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find support, then this will mean that we need to take account of whether electoral authoritarian 
regimes can effectively institutionalize elections as part of their adaptive strategy or whether 
democratic emulation is a dead end for the perpetuation of authoritarianism.   
We also move beyond the existing literature by accounting for the nature of elections.  
We differentiate between multiparty elections and multiparty elections with a higher degree of 
competition.  In running our tests, we thus examine both electoral authoritarian regimes (that 
hold multiparty elections of any kind) and competitive authoritarian regimes (those that hold 
competitive multiparty elections).  We do this because we believe that the lower the degree of 
manipulation by the authoritarian incumbents the more dangerous elections are in the short-
term, but that this may boost their prospects for survival in the long-term because of the 
legitimizing effects of competitive elections. 
We also run models for authoritarian regime breakdown and democratic transition, 
something that is not universal in this literature.  We do this to gauge whether different degrees 
of opening not only have differential effects on regime survival, but whether the nature of 
opening has distinct effects on the nature of the successor regime.  We thus both examine 
whether multiparty and competitive elections promote authoritarian survival, authoritarian 
replacement, or a transition to democracy.  
 
IV. Methodology 
We test these competing theories by employing a series of models estimating the correlates of 
regime survival and transition. We begin by replicating Brownlee (2009) by testing for the impact 
of discrete regime classifications, namely competitive and non-competitive electoral 
authoritarianism.  Afterward, we test the democratization by elections hypothesis by including a 
count of the number of iterated multiparty elections. We add further nuance by delimiting 
competitive elections as a more restrictive class of multiparty elections.  
Our analysis extends previous research by not only incorporating more precise measures 
of election cycles, but by also using a unique combination of event history modeling. We begin 
with discrete logistic models assessing the probability of authoritarian failure and the probability 
of democratic transition as two distinct outcomes.  The basic logistic regression model is defined 
as (Long 1997):  
    Pr 𝑌 = 1 𝒙) = !"# (!!𝛃𝒙)!! !"# (!!𝛃𝒙)     (1) 
We adapt this model for discrete event history analysis using the methodology 
recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010), whereby time is modeled as a cubic polynomial. 
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The risk set is limited to cases coded as authoritarian. Thus countries leave the sample when they 
become democratic, but may re-enter at a later stage if they revert to authoritarianism. 
Authoritarian episodes that persist to 2010 are right censored.  To account for multiple events 
within the same case, we include controls for previous authoritarian episodes and previous 
democratic transitions.  
Noting that the classic event history models fail to take into account the possibility of 
one authoritarian regime being replaced by another (authoritarian replacement), we further 
investigate the effect of reiterated elections using competing risk models.  We assume that there 
are three possible regime outcomes for a given country-year: authoritarian survival, authoritarian 
replacement, and democratic transition.  We compare how experiences with iterated election 
cycles affect the relative odds of each potential outcome. The competing risks model is defined 
as a multinomial logistic regression model (Long 1997):  
   Pr 𝑌 = 𝑚 𝒙) = !"# (𝒙𝛃!|!)!"# (𝒙𝛃!|!)!!!!     (2) 
where m is one of several possible mutually exclusive outcomes and j is the reference outcome. 
For example, we might compare the odds of democratic transition (m) to authoritarian survival 
(j). Again, to apply this model in discrete event history analysis, we incorporate a cubic 
polynomial of time and limit the sample to an authoritarian risk set.  
 
Dependent Variables 
For our dependent variables, we use the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (v1.2) developed by 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).  This dataset includes authoritarian regime trajectories for 
120 countries from 1946-2010.4 Our first set of models test for the influence of elections and 
regime types on authoritarian failure and democratic transition. These two variables are coded as 
binaries, with zero (0) indicating authoritarian survival and one (1) indicating the outcome of 
interest.5  For the competing risk models, we use a multinomial variable measuring three 
potential (mutually-exclusive) outcomes: (0) authoritarian survival, (1) democratic transition, or 
(2) authoritarian replacement.6   
 
																																								 																				
4 Alternatively, the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) dataset includes 219 countries (including democracies) from 
1800-2010. However, their data only includes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns. This precludes 
analysis of authoritarian replacement. For robustness, we do, however, include estimates of democratic transition 
using this dataset (see Appendix Table A1).   
5 We code authoritarian failure using the failure variable (variable: fail). We code democratic transition using the 
subsequent regime coding (variable: fail_subsregime). See Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset. 
6 We code this variable using the subsequent regime coding (variable: fail_subsregime). See Geddes, Wright, and 
Frantz (2014) dataset. 
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Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables draw upon the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset 
(version 6.2; Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b). The V-Dem data provides a comprehensive set of 
indicators of democratic qualities for most countries from 1900 to 2015.7 Drawing on Brownlee 
(2009), we begin by testing whether differences in the electoral character of the regime affect 
authoritarian survival. We differentiate three types of authoritarian regimes: closed, non-
competitive electoral, and competitive electoral.8 Closed authoritarian regimes are defined by the 
absence of multiparty elections (i.e. their multiparty election count is zero).  These include 
traditional non-electoral regimes (e.g. absolute monarchies) and regimes that hold elections 
under which only a single or no parties are allowed to compete (e.g. single-party regimes).  Non-
competitive electoral authoritarian regimes regularly hold multiparty elections but these do not 
meet the minimum competitive criteria for competitive elections. Finally, competitive electoral 
authoritarian regimes hold competitive elections but remain outside the minimum criteria to 
qualify as a democracy.9  
Afterward, we focus on our main independent variables. These measure the effect of 
elections as cumulative over repeated uninterrupted cycles rather than as a discrete effect based 
on mere presence or absence. We utilize the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, v6.2) dataset to 
count the number of iterated elections (Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b). We begin by following 
Lindberg (2006, 2009) with a count of the number of multiparty elections held since the last 
electoral interruption. However, we also include a more restrictive measure of competitive iterated 
elections.  Because countries hold elections at different intervals, we assume that elections for 
the more powerful branch of government will have the greatest impact on authoritarian 
(in)stability.10  Therefore both election variables are adjusted for system of government.11 For 
																																								 																				
7 Each indicator is measured using survey data from at least 5 country experts. The values from each expert 
response are aggregated using a Bayesian measurement model (see Pemstein, Tzelgov, and Wang 2015; Pemstein et 
al. 2015). 
8 The literature on electoral authoritarianism points to a distinct sub-class of hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, or 
those that hold non-competitive multiparty elections. However, because we do not incorporate criteria regarding the 
distribution of seats in the legislature and/or votes for the executive, using this terminology might be misleading. 
Our sample of competitive authoritarian regimes includes several cases where the ruling party enjoys a relative 
hegemony in terms of distribution of power. For example, Tanzania has held five competitive elections since 1995, 
but the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has consistently won more than seventy percent of the seats in the 
legislature.  
9 We code this binary based on the iterated competitive election count (see FN 11). Electoral authoritarian regimes 
have held at least one (1) multiparty election. Closed authoritarian regimes have an iterated multiparty election count 
of zero (0). Competitive electoral authoritarian regimes have held at least one (1) competitive election. Non-
competitive authoritarian regimes have an iterated competitive election count of zero (0). We also run models 
estimating the more general effect of electoral authoritarianism combining the non-competitive and competitive 
categories (see Appendix Table A2). The results presented in the main models suggest that the combined effect of 
electoral authoritarianism is being driven by competitive electoral authoritarian regimes.  
10 Where the executive is directly elected, we assume that executive elections will attract more attention and have 
greater repercussions for regime (in)stability.  In many cases where executives and legislatures are both directly 
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regimes in which the chief executive is directly elected, we count only executive elections.  For 
regimes in which the chief executive is not directly elected, we count only legislative elections.12  
Based on the extant literature, we suspect that the relationship between iterated elections 
and authoritarian survival is non-linear. We run models to check for linear, quadratic, and cubic 
relationships. Our analysis of various measures of fit suggests that the functional form varies 
depending on which pair of outcomes we are comparing. Therefore, we only present the best 
fitting functional form for the logistic regression, but provide alternative specifications in the 
appendix (see Appendix Table A3).  This includes a quadric relationship between elections and 
authoritarian failure, but a cubic relationship for democratic transition. For the multinomial 
models, we provide the full set of estimates and discuss variation in terms of functional form 
across pairs of outcomes.  
 
Control Variables 
The literature on authoritarian survival and democratic transition includes a robust set of 
potential confounders. As a result, wherever possible, we include these as covariates in all our 
models.  
Both economic development and economic performance are commonly correlated with 
regime survival.  Additionally, there is a substantial debate over whether more developed 
countries tend to democratize. We measure economic development as the natural log of per 
capita gross domestic product lagged by one year. In terms of economic performance, those 
regimes that perform poorly are more likely to be overthrown, while those that perform well are 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																											
elected, these occur within the same year. Thus a choice as to which election to count becomes irrelevant. In those 
cases, where legislative and executive elections are not held during the same year, we expect that the net effect of 
holding an additional legislative election is minimal.  Our choices allow us to concentrate on those elections where 
turnovers in power are feasible. 
11 See Coppedge et al. 2016a. Legislative elections (v2eltype_0) and executive elections (v2eltype_6) for first round 
are included. An election counts as multiparty if it scores at or above 2 on the V-Dem variable v2elmulpar_ord. An 
election counts as competitive if it (a) fulfills the multiparty criteria; (b) scores at or above 2 on the Clean Elections 
Index (V-Dem variable v2xel_frefair); and (c) meets a minimum of 25% adult suffrage (V-Dem variable v2x_suffr). 
For seven observations, data was available on multiparty elections but not competitive elections. Thus we exclude 
these from the analysis to maintain the same sample of cases (N=4157). We use the V-Dem measure for electoral 
regime (v2x_elereg) to measure electoral interruptions. A country also experiences an electoral interruption when it 
experiences an election that fails to meet the minimum criteria for multiparty or competitive elections (where 
applicable). We also cross-checked each case.  A list of cases where the authors disagreed with the V-Dem coding 
and recoded elections, multipartism, and/or breaks is available in the online appendix. We exclude observations 
where the country is not independent, but include pre-independence elections.  
12 Chief executive is operationalized as the executive office that wields the most power. In cases where the head of 
state and head of government are two separate individuals, we estimate the relative power of each based on their de 
facto powers (v2exdfcbhs, v2exdfdmhs, v2exdfdshs, v2exdfpphs, v2exdfvths, v2exdjcbhg, v2exdfdshg, v2exdjdshg, 
v2exdfpphg, v2exdfvthg) and their de facto method of appointment (v2expathhs, v2expathhg).  If a directly elected 
head of state serves as a figurehead or wields less power than an indirectly elected head of government, we count 
legislative elections.  
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likely to survive.  We measure economic performance as per capita GDP growth lagged by one 
year.13  
In addition to these measures of economic development and performance, regimes may 
also ensure their survival through the use of rents and repression.  Rents can be used both to 
enhance repressive capacities and secure compliance by economic incentives, making regimes 
less likely to experience failure.  Rents also allow elites to minimize calls for accountability that 
might occur where states are reliant upon extracting taxes from the population. We include a 
measure of oil production per capita to control for access to these rents.14 In addition to rents, 
authoritarian countries with larger militaries also have a greater potential capacity to repress 
threats to the regime. Therefore, we control for military personnel per capita.15  
Regimes with polarized ethnic cleavages may be more likely to experience instability and 
governability issues. The literature also suggests that ethnic polarization can have detrimental 
effects for democratization. To control for its potential effects, we include a variable that 
captures ethnic fractionalization as the likelihood that any two randomly chosen persons will be 
from different ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
The degree to which a country’s civil society is capable of mobilizing to press demands 
against the incumbent regime may also affect the likelihood of authoritarian failure and 
subsequent regime outcomes.  We include a measure of civil society participation over the past 
five years.16   
The post-Cold War period is particularly known for regime instability and a larger 
number of democratic transitions when compared to other time periods within the sample.17 We 
include a dummy variable to control for this time period, coded as one (1) if the country-year 
occurs during or after 1989.  
Specific states may be prone regime instability and experience multiple instances of 
authoritarian failure and/or democratic transition. Over time, past chronic regime instability 
might well enhance the probability of future failures or transitions. Therefore, when estimating 
																																								 																				
13 Estimates of GDP and GDP per capita growth come from the Maddison Project (measured in 1990 International 
GK dollars). See Bolt and Zanden (2014); Maddison-Project (2013). 
14 Based on combined estimates from Ross 2013 and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2006. 
15 We coded this variable using the National Material Capabilities (NMC) Dataset (variable = milper / tpop). Where 
data are missing in the NMC, particularly post-2007, we replaced missing values with data from the World Bank. 
See Greig and Enterline (2010), Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), and World Bank (2016).  
16 We calculated this as a 5-year moving average of the country’s score on the V-Dem Civil Society Participation 
Index (v2x_cspart). See Coppedge et al. 2016a. 
17 The post-Cold War period makes up about one-third (33.02%) of the observations within our sample. Of the 215 
authoritarian failures – roughly 36% of these occurred in the post-Cold War. While the post-Cold War period saw 
55% of the democratic transitions within the sample, only 20% of the authoritarian reversals occurred during this 
same period. We also tested for whether other distinct time periods should be controlled for (i.e. post-1974 third 
wave). But found that only post-Cold War added substantively to the models.  
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authoritarian failure and in our competing risks models, we include a count of the country’s 
previous authoritarian failures. When estimating democratic transition, we also include a count 
of previous democratic transitions.  
In addition to previous endogenous experiences with regime fragility and democracy, 
geographic location within a particularly democratic or non-democratic neighborhood could 
exogenously influence regime outcomes. To control for this, we include an estimate of the 
average level of democracy within the region using the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index.18  
The duration of the authoritarian regime may also influence (in)stability.  Drawing on 
Brownlee (2009) and Carter and Signorino (2010), we model time as a curvilinear (cubic 
polynomial) relationship with regime survival. We expect that younger and older electoral and 
competitive authoritarian regimes will be more likely to fail when compared to those that have 
reached an average age.  
Finally, in the Appendix (Table A5 and Table A6) we present results when controlling 
for Levitsky and Way’s (2010) linkage and leverage argument using foreign aid and foreign direct 
investment both as share of GDP.19 We do not include these controls in the main models 
because extensive data for most cases is not available until after the 1970s. This would reduce 
our sample by over thirty years.  
 
Results 
We first present results for the discrete event history logistic regression models before delving 
into a more nuanced investigation of authoritarian trajectories using multinomial competing risks 
models.  Table 1 presents results from our logistic regression models with binary outcomes for 
authoritarian failure (Models 1-3) and democratic transition (Models 4-6). Table 2 illustrates our 
findings from the competing risks models (Models 7-13). For purposes of interpretation, we 
present these results as the estimated coefficients predicting the change in odds of one outcome 
over another in three separate tables.  
 
																																								 																				
18 Coppedge et al 2016a; Teorell at al. 2016. We use this V-Dem measure to limit potential endogeneity with the 
outcome measures. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not use V-Dem to determine regime categories. We 
define seven geo-political regions as: (1) sub-Saharan Africa; (2) Middle East and North Africa; (3) Latin America 
and Caribbean; (4) Asia; (5) postcommunist Eurasia; (6) Oceania; and (7) Western democracies (including Europe, 
U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).   
19 We measure foreign aid as net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) using the 
World Bank (2016). We measure foreign direct investment inflows as estimated by the United Nations (2015). 
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Table 1. Estimates of Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratic Transition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -0.23 -0.01
(0.28) (0.45)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 1.26*** 1.99***
(0.20) (0.36)
Multiparty Elections 0.39** 0.53*
(0.13) (0.24)
Multiparty Elections (square) -0.06** -0.10*
(0.02) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
Competitive Elections 1.06*** 1.83***
(0.22) (0.40)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.19** -0.46**
(0.07) (0.14)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.01^ 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.22 0.34^ 0.28
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -3.07** -3.00** -3.16** -4.78** -4.77** -4.75**
(1.15) (1.16) (1.16) (1.61) (1.62) (1.57)
Oil production per capita (t-1) 0.09 -0.02 0.13 -10.02 -13.22 -11.03
(1.65) (1.67) (1.67) (14.02) (16.17) (18.09)
Military personnel (per capita) -25.25^ -18.91 -24.68^ -22.85 -16.09 -25.10
(14.65) (13.03) (13.84) (23.83) (22.85) (23.92)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 -0.18 -0.05 -0.11
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.49) (0.48) (0.51)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) 0.14 0.88* 0.03 -0.76 1.02* -0.50
(0.43) (0.35) (0.41) (0.71) (0.52) (0.68)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) -0.45* -0.43* -0.45* 0.11 0.08 0.16
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) 0.09** 0.08** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.55** 0.48** 0.51**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17)
Regional Democracy Score (average) 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10* 0.12** 0.10*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age (square) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.93 -1.14 -0.79 -5.46*** -6.48*** -5.75***
(0.72) (0.69) (0.73) (1.40) (1.42) (1.44)
Pseudo_R2 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.15
Countries 108 108 108 108 108 108
Observations 4088 4088 4088 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 331.09 245.27 273.42 160.89 239.14 148.05
AIC 1813.58 1875.26 1825.97 796.76 847.89 811.93
BIC 1908.32 1976.31 1927.02 891.19 948.62 912.66
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions.  Reference for regime type in Model 1 
and Model 4 is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Authoritarian Failure Democratic Transition
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We begin by estimating the effect of electoral authoritarian regimes (Model 1 and Model 
4). As anticipated, the results suggest that authoritarian regimes with regular competitive 
elections are both more likely to fail and more likely to democratize. All else equal, the odds of 
failure for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes are 2.5 times greater and the odds of 
democratic transition are over 6 times greater when compared to closed authoritarian regimes. In 
contrast, we find no difference between non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes and 
closed authoritarian regimes when it comes to authoritarian failure or democratic transition.   
At odds with Brownlee (2009), our results support the hypothesis that competitive 
electoral environments make authoritarian regimes more prone to failure and to democratic 
transition. There are several reasons that might explain why our results depart from Brownlee 
(2009). First, our sample of cases includes most authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010, 
whereas Brownlee’s is limited to 1975 to 2004. Secondly, the democratic transition outcome uses 
authoritarian persistence, either as the same regime or a new authoritarian regime, as its 
reference category. This heterogeneity in the reference could be problematic but avoids potential 
selection bias and small sample size resulting from a limited analysis of only those cases that 
experience authoritarian failure. In our set of competing risk models (Table 2), we address this 
problem more systematically by including all three potential regime outcomes. Finally, our 
analyses include different control variables. We exclude the regime classifications developed by 
Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014) because of likely correlation with electoral authoritarian 
categories (e.g. all single-party regimes are by definition closed regimes). We also exclude 
variables controlling for regions because we find that these are not significant for our sample. 
Our Appendix (Table A4) includes our replication of Brownlee (2009) using the expanded 
sample and our chosen covariates. These results again contradict his findings with regard to 
authoritarian failure. We continue to see a robust effect of competitive authoritarianism on 
authoritarian collapse.20  
The next set of models directly tests the democratization via elections thesis. Moving 
beyond the mere presence of multiparty (or competitive) elections, we estimate how each 
additional iterated multiparty or competitive election affects the likelihood of authoritarian 
failure and more accurately, democratic transition. We extend the previous literature by allowing 
for a non-linear relationship. The results show support for a cubic function when estimating 
both authoritarian failure and democratic transition.21 Unlike discrete regime classifications, we 
																																								 																				
20 Indeed, these results and the results presented in Table A2 suggest that the destabilizing and democratizing effects 
of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes are driven primarily by the achievement of minimal levels of 
competition. 
21 We base this on a series of estimates including Likelihood Ratio tests and AIC and BIC scores.  We privilege the 
BIC over the AIC in comparing linear to quadratic and cubic specifications, because by its nature the AIC 
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find that under authoritarianism iterated multiparty elections, regardless if minimally competitive, 
exhibit an inverted-U shape relationship with regime failure (Models 2 and 3) and democratic 
transition (Models 5 and 6). For the first four rounds of multiparty (or competitive) elections, 
the odds of authoritarian failure are increasing. However, if authoritarian elites can survive these 
first four elections, each additional election adds to their odds of survival.22  Models 5 and 6 
suggest that experiences with elections, whether multiparty or competitive, exhibit a similar 
pattern with regard to democratic transition. We see that the cumulative effect of iterated 
multiparty and competitive elections at first makes authoritarian regimes more likely to 
experience a democratic transition. The effect is substantially stronger for competitive elections; 
however, generally speaking after three electoral cycles, democratic transition becomes less likely 
with each additional uninterrupted election. Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship graphically. 
We constrain our predictions to within-sample and only present those with significant marginal 
effects (p<0.10).  
 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regression Models 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																											
downgrades the fit of models with a larger number of independent variables. Models using alternative specifications 
are available in Table A3.  
22 In our within sample estimates, we do find a slight upturn in the odds of authoritarian failure after 10 competitive 
elections; however, only two observations achieve 10 competitive elections. This prediction should be taken with 
caution, despite being significant at p<0.10.  
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Our findings introduce a novel note of contingency into the theory that reiterated 
elections lead to democratization. They suggest that the introduction of competitive elections is 
most dangerous in the first few iterations, but that the risk diminishes as authoritarian regimes 
institutionalize elections. This suggests that when authoritarian incumbents successfully contend 
for power beyond the first four or five rounds of multiparty elections, each additional election 
actually lowers the risk of failure and democratic transition.  
 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 0.03
(0.44)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 2.04***
(0.37)
Multiparty Elections 0.03 0.09 0.55*
(0.04) (0.11) (0.24)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.00 -0.10*
(0.01) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00*
(0.00)
Competitive Elections 0.19* 1.03*** 1.84***
(0.09) (0.29) (0.41)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.12* -0.46**
(0.06) (0.15)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.03**
(0.01)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) 0.22 0.35^ 0.34^ 0.33^ 0.30 0.28 0.28
(0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -4.97** -4.64** -4.72** -5.00** -4.78** -4.81** -4.97**
(1.62) (1.60) (1.61) (1.64) (1.60) (1.59) (1.59)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -9.82 -15.08 -15.50 -12.82 -18.98 -10.10 -11.03
(14.33) (16.85) (17.72) (16.31) (19.98) (15.56) (18.38)
Military personnel (per capita) -27.28 -21.56 -20.50 -19.45 -21.40 -29.40 -29.62
(26.12) (23.68) (24.00) (24.06) (23.11) (25.80) (25.84)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08
(0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.52) (0.54) (0.53)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -0.83 1.07* 1.00^ 0.88 0.54 -0.51 -0.61
(0.71) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.62) (0.67) (0.70)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.19 0.12 0.08
(0.37) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37)
Previous Authoritarian Failures 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Regional Democracy Score 0.10* 0.12*** 0.11** 0.12** 0.11** 0.10* 0.09*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -5.60*** -6.51*** -6.46*** -6.56*** -6.05*** -5.64*** -5.86***
(1.48) (1.45) (1.47) (1.48) (1.42) (1.47) (1.51)
Pseudo_R2 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Countries 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Observations 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 257.88 215.22 230.76 414.24 230.54 214.66 246.51
AIC 1787.03 1844.55 1848.09 1841.25 1840.66 1817.48 1808.89
BIC 1975.89 2020.82 2036.96 2042.70 2016.94 2006.34 2010.35
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions.  ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 2a. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Democratic Transition over Authoritarian Survival
Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Survival
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Thus far we have limited our models to two potential outcomes for authoritarian 
regimes: survival and democratic transition.  However, authoritarian failures can sometimes 
result in authoritarian replacement. Incumbents face threats from both would-be democratizers 
and authoritarian alternatives. These competing risks are modeled in Table 2. The multinomial 
logistic model predicts a separate set of coefficients (ß) for each predictor (x) for each possible 
pair of outcomes (m/j). The exponentiated coefficients express the predicted change in odds of 
outcome m over outcome j. As a result, each model predicts separate coefficients for each 
independent variable for each possible pair of outcomes. For purposes of interpretation, we 
make three separate sets of comparisons (Table 2a, 2b, and 2c). It is important to remember that 
each of these tables presents results from the same set of models (Models 7-13), just different 
coefficients from those models based on the pair of outcomes being compared (i.e. how m and j 
are defined).  
In Table 2a, we compare the odds of democratic transition (m) over authoritarian 
survival (j). By taking into account the potential for authoritarian replacement, these models not 
only replicate but also provide robustness for our logistic regressions in Table 1 (Models 4-6). 
The estimated effect of competitive authoritarianism on democratic transition increases when we 
account for the possibility of authoritarian replacement. All else equal, the odds of a democratic 
transition rather than survival are 8 times greater for a competitive electoral authoritarian regime 
when compared to a closed authoritarian regime. Non-competitive electoral authoritarian 
regimes continue to be no more or less likely to experience democratic transition than closed 
regimes. The results in Models 8 to 13 also support the previous finding that if authoritarian 
leaders can survive the first few rounds of multiparty (or competitive) elections, they experience 
increasing odds of authoritarian survival over democratic transition with each subsequent 
election  Once again the effect of competitive elections is stronger when compared to multiparty 
elections (regardless of their level of competition).  
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In Table 2b, we present results estimating the odds of authoritarian replacement (m) over 
survival (j). In Model 7, we find that, when compared to closed authoritarian regimes, the odds 
of authoritarian replacement for regimes with flawed multiparty elections (i.e. non-competitive) 
are 47.5% lower than authoritarian survival (but only at 90% confidence). This suggests that 
theories on how elections create credible commitments within authoritarian coalitions have 
some credence. Simultaneously, this finding could imply that where electoral competition is 
already constrained, stability is prioritized over (less certain) authoritarian alternatives. Likewise, 
the linear term for iterated multiparty elections in Model 8 is significant (at 90%), suggesting that 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -0.64^
(0.37)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 0.04
(0.32)
Multiparty Elections -0.13^ -0.12 -0.13
(0.07) (0.14) (0.23)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00
(0.00)
Competitive Elections -0.05 0.16 0.27
(0.10) (0.26) (0.45)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.04 -0.09
(0.05) (0.18)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.01
(0.01)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.22^ -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.26^ -0.26^ -0.26^
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -3.46* -3.43* -3.44* -3.43* -3.57* -3.59* -3.60*
(1.63) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66)
Oil production per capita (t-1) 2.03 1.82 1.83 1.83 2.32^ 2.34^ 2.35^
(1.35) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24)
Military personnel (per capita) -57.19* -58.21* -58.14* -58.05* -52.41* -52.81* -52.80*
(23.35) (24.09) (24.09) (24.06) (22.24) (22.18) (22.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.31 -0.26 -0.25 -0.25 -0.29 -0.30 -0.30
(0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) 0.41 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.53 0.42 0.41
(0.57) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) -0.88** -0.90** -0.90** -0.90** -0.93** -0.93** -0.94**
(0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Previous Authoritarian Failures 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Regional Democracy Score 0.08^ 0.08^ 0.08^ 0.08^ 0.08^ 0.08^ 0.08^
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.81 -1.24 -1.24 -1.24 -0.73 -0.72 -0.73
(0.97) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99)
Pseudo_R2 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Countries 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00
Observations 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 257.88 215.22 230.76 414.24 230.54 214.66 246.51
AIC 1787.03 1844.55 1848.09 1841.25 1840.66 1817.48 1808.89
BIC 1975.89 2020.82 2036.96 2042.70 2016.94 2006.34 2010.35
Table 2b. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival
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for each additional multiparty election, the odds of authoritarian replacement over survival 
decrease by about 12%. Yet we see no influence of iterated competitive election counts on the 
odds ratio of authoritarian replacement to authoritarian survival.  Thus the results weakly 
support the hypothesis that regime types rather than electoral sequences differentiate between 
these two outcomes. 
 
 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 0.67
(0.53)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 2.00***
(0.48)
Multiparty Elections 0.16^ 0.21 0.68*
(0.09) (0.17) (0.32)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.00 -0.11
(0.01) (0.07)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00
(0.00)
Competitive Elections 0.24^ 0.87* 1.58**
(0.12) (0.37) (0.54)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.08 -0.37^
(0.08) (0.22)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.02
(0.02)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) 0.44^ 0.53* 0.52* 0.52* 0.56* 0.54* 0.54*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -1.51 -1.21 -1.28 -1.57 -1.21 -1.22 -1.37
(2.08) (2.14) (2.14) (2.15) (2.14) (2.11) (2.09)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -11.86 -16.91 -17.32 -14.64 -21.29 -12.44 -13.38
(14.50) (17.02) (17.88) (16.45) (20.12) (15.68) (18.51)
Military personnel (per capita) 29.92 36.65 37.63 38.60 31.01 23.41 23.18
(34.53) (33.24) (33.65) (33.72) (31.63) (34.00) (33.81)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.22
(0.64) (0.61) (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (0.65) (0.65)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -1.24 0.31 0.24 0.12 0.01 -0.93 -1.02
(0.92) (0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.82) (0.89) (0.91)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) 0.90^ 1.09* 1.08* 0.93^ 1.12* 1.06* 1.01^
(0.54) (0.49) (0.50) (0.52) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52)
Previous Authoritarian Failures 0.20* 0.18* 0.19* 0.19* 0.17* 0.18* 0.18*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Regional Democracy Score 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Time 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -4.79** -5.27** -5.22** -5.33** -5.32** -4.92** -5.13**
(1.74) (1.80) (1.81) (1.83) (1.75) (1.79) (1.82)
Pseudo_R2 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10
Countries 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00
Observations 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 257.88 215.22 230.76 414.24 230.54 214.66 246.51
AIC 1787.03 1844.55 1848.09 1841.25 1840.66 1817.48 1808.89
BIC 1975.89 2020.82 2036.96 2042.70 2016.94 2006.34 2010.35
Table 2c. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Democratic Transition over Authoritarian Replacement
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions.  ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Replacement
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Finally, Table 2c estimates the effect of elections on the competing risks of democratic 
transition (m) versus authoritarian replacement (j).  In other words, given that failure will occur, 
what are the odds of a democratic transition rather than authoritarian replacement? Model 7 
suggests that, when compared to closed authoritarian regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes 
are about 7 times more likely to be replaced by a democracy rather than another authoritarian 
regime. This contrasts with non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, which are no more 
or less likely to experience democratic transition over authoritarian replacement when compared 
to closed regimes. This suggests that elections matter, and the character of these elections can 
dramatically increase the likelihood for democratic transition.  
Models 8 to 13 further test this finding by accounting for the history of iterated elections 
within authoritarian countries. For this pair of outcomes, multiparty elections appear to exhibit a 
linear relationship, whereas the relationship for competitive elections is quadratic. For each 
additional multiparty election, the odds that an authoritarian failure will result in democratic 
transition rather than authoritarian replacement increase by about 97%. The shape of the 
relationship for competitive elections is less clear. While the count of competitive elections is 
significant, in Model 13, when we include a square and cube term, the inverted-U shape of the 
relationship return, but only at 90% for the quadratic term. The cubic term remains insignificant. 
This suggests that authoritarian failures may be increasingly more likely to result in democratic 
transition during early competitive election cycles. However, for authoritarian regimes managing 
to survive past these early cycles, failure is increasingly less likely to result in democratic transition 
as the number of competitive cycles thereafter increases. This implies that longer histories of 
competition under authoritarianism may have a detrimental impact on the possibility for 
democracy should a breakdown occur, perhaps because authoritarian incumbents have 
demonstrated that despite free and fair elections, they are able to remain in power.  
Our results suggest that overall, multipartism within authoritarian contexts can be a 
double-edged sword. First, there appears to be a stabilizing effect of non-competitive multiparty 
elections in fending off authoritarian challenges to incumbents. This suggests that flawed 
elections tend to support the status quo government if that government faces threats from an 
authoritarian alternative. This seems to provide some confirmation for arguments about how 
elections help incumbents maintain their position in power by revealing important informational 
cues or building credible commitments within the authoritarian ruling coalition. Yet the effect of 
elections is much more dangerous, at least in the early stages, when we consider the likelihood of 
democratic transition. Our models suggest that overall, competitive authoritarian regimes are 
more likely to fail and democratize. However, when we take into account electoral experience, 
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we find that autocrats face the highest threat of democratization during the first two or three 
election cycles. Afterward, the impact of elections diminishes and begins to approach nil with 
more and more elections. This is a new finding that merits some attention. Figure 2 plots these 
results for iterated elections from Table 2 using marginal effects to predict overall probabilities 
for democratic transition. Again, we constrain our estimates to within-sample using average 
values for all other predictors and only plot marginal effects that are significant (p<0.10). 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities from Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
 
To avoid overstating nature of these findings, it is important to understand empirically 
how often authoritarian regimes actually survive past two or three competitive elections.  Figure 
3 shows the distribution of the maximum number of multiparty and competitive multiparty 
iterated elections for the 108 authoritarian cases in our sample. Between 1946 and 2010, on 
average authoritarian regimes experienced 1.19 iterated multiparty elections or 0.38 competitive 
elections.  While less than 30% of our cases experienced more than three iterated multiparty 
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elections, less than 11% survived past or held more than three competitive elections by 2010.23 
This helps to explain why we are unable to obtain significant predictions for marginal effects 
beyond seven multiparty elections and four competitive elections. More importantly, this 
suggests that while competitive elections have the potential to provide for authoritarian regime 
stability in the long-run, such outcomes are relatively rare. Ultimately then reiterated elections 
under authoritarianism are not a formidable barrier to democratic regime change.  In most cases, 
authoritarian regimes have not managed to safely institutionalize electoral mechanisms and reap 
their potential benefits. This means that our tests using authoritarian sub-type variables and 
election counts are not that different despite the different effects over the iteration of elections. 
Most of the cases coded as electoral authoritarian have experienced fewer than three elections.  
 
Figure 3. Maximum Observed Number of Multiparty and Competitive Elections 
 
 
  
																																								 																				
23 This includes about 33 cases where the election count is censored at 2010.   
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Conclusion 
While the collapse of a large number conventional authoritarian regimes in the final phases of 
the Cold War and in its aftermath did not lead to the kind of rapid emergence of universal 
democracy imagined by some (Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1992), it did radically change the 
mix of regimes globally.  Beyond the expansion of the number of democracies, the most 
profound change was a fundamental shift in the nature of authoritarianism.  The democratic 
zeitgeist compelled many dictators to convoke elections if they wanted to maintain their hold on 
power.  The widespread holding of elections in regimes that fell short of the minimal conditions 
necessary for democracy led to two strands of thinking in the discipline about what this all 
meant.  On one hand a group of scholars thought of the convocation of elections under 
authoritarian conditions represented a path to democracy by evolutionary, less disjunctive means 
than the classic literature on transition.  Others saw in the ability of dictators to hold and win 
elections as a means to stabilize authoritarian rule by unlocking new and useful information, 
building durable authoritarian electoral coalitions, derailing opposition, or cementing credible 
commitments to the incumbent in coalitions of authoritarian rule. 
While the literature has turned up a range of conflicting findings that could be read as 
being supportive of both positions, it seems unlikely that both could simultaneously be true 
without some attention to contingencies.  We thus took a new approach and not only focused 
on authoritarian subtypes but also looked at the ability of authoritarian regimes to institutionalize 
elections as a component of durable authoritarian rule.  Such an approach entailed three novel 
facets: 1) gauging the impact of reiterated elections over time, 2) distinguishing between more 
and less competitive elections under authoritarianism, and 3) looking at two alternatives to 
incumbent regime survival – democratization and authoritarian replacement.  These tests yielded 
a range of novel findings for a sample of 108 authoritarian regimes for the period 1946 to 2010 
using conventional event history and competing risk models. 
Our results show that in the in the short run electoral competition is dangerous for 
authoritarian regimes and that this danger is magnified if elections are more competitive.  
However, those authoritarian regimes that manage to survive past the first few electoral cycles, 
i.e. those which successfully institutionalize elections, are more durable. This danger is enhanced 
in the short run where autocrats allow at least a minimal level of competition, but that danger 
also abates faster.  To this we must add one important caveat -- few authoritarian regimes 
actually survive past the first three election cycles.  This then means on balance that despite the 
non-linear effect we detected, we find more support for the theory of suicide by competition 
than survival via democratic emulation.  
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Our exploration of different forms of authoritarian failure yielded a set of interesting 
nuanced results as well.  In our authoritarian survival models we found that multiparty elections 
(regardless of level of competition) do affect survival prospects, but that this exhibits an 
inverted-U shape, with higher risk in earlier elections diminishing over time. When we consider 
democratic transition as an outcome, we also found that both multiparty elections and 
competitive elections have a cubic relationship, with higher risk earlier on, followed by a period 
of diminished risk.  The positive coefficient on the cubic term was quite modest and given the 
low number of observations of authoritarian regimes with a very high number of elections, not 
particularly noteworthy. 
When we move to competing risk models, we continue to find a cubic relationship 
between the tradeoff between democratic transition versus authoritarian survival for both 
multiparty and competitive election counts, supporting our initial findings.  When we looked at 
the tradeoff between authoritarian replacements versus authoritarian survival we found a 
negative linear relationship for both reiterated multiparty elections.  This indicates for those 
authoritarian regimes that can contain efforts at democratization, holding elections can help to 
cement the hold of the authoritarian incumbent.  This also adds some nuance to our finding on 
suicide by competition. While it promotes democratization generally, there is some smaller 
subset of durable authoritarian regimes it helps to fortify. Finally, for those authoritarian regimes 
that do fail, the holding of reiterated elections makes them more likely to transition to 
democracy than a new form of authoritarianism. For multiparty elections at a lower level of 
competition the effect is linear and positive.  For competitive elections the effect is once again 
enhanced in the early stages of the electoral sequence but diminishes after the first few iterations.  
Thus, we conclude that dictators that stage elections in the hope that democratic 
emulation will make their rule more durable are playing a dangerous game.  In the earliest stages 
of this process they place their rule at enhanced risk of failure.  If they can navigate this early 
risky period, they may buy more time for their rule, though the descriptive evidence on this 
shows that this is a relatively rare occurrence.  For those authoritarian regimes that are able to 
stave off pressures for democratization, elections may indeed help them to contain alternative 
authoritarian contenders for power.   But all in all, dictators who risk their future hold on power 
by democratic emulation are more like gamblers who are betting against the house, rather than 
contemporary Machiavellis.   
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Appendix 
	 	
(A1.1) (A1.2) (A1.3) (A1.4) (A1.5) (A1.6) (A1.7)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 1.87***
(0.53)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 4.23***
(0.55)
Multiparty Elections 0.05* 0.28^ 0.99***
(0.03) (0.16) (0.22)
Multiparty Elections (square) -0.02 -0.17***
(0.02) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.01***
(0.00)
Competitive Elections 0.21** 1.58*** 2.48***
(0.07) (0.35) (0.40)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.22** -0.59***
(0.08) (0.14)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.03***
(0.01)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) 0.13 0.39* 0.34^ 0.33^ 0.40* 0.29 0.27
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -3.75* -3.61* -3.99* -4.36** -3.70* -3.68* -3.84*
(1.66) (1.66) (1.65) (1.68) (1.65) (1.72) (1.69)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -7.90 -16.95 -17.31 -13.03 -23.36 -6.77 -6.49
(10.00) (18.00) (20.36) (17.31) (22.04) (9.24) (8.64)
Military personnel (per capita) -23.35 -31.89 -29.38 -23.89 -31.81 -47.54^ -49.58^
(23.47) (22.56) (21.73) (21.09) (22.19) (25.96) (26.42)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.01 -0.27 -0.21 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14 -0.08
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.51) (0.50) (0.55) (0.55)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -0.58 2.25*** 1.99** 1.77** 1.69** 0.47 0.21
(0.72) (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.62) (0.68) (0.70)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) -0.57^ -0.26 -0.31 -0.50 -0.14 -0.37 -0.50
(0.34) (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.35)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.58*** 0.34** 0.41** 0.51*** 0.33** 0.52*** 0.55***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
Regional Democracy Score (average) 0.10* 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age (square) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00^ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) 0.00 -0.00^ 0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00^ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -7.53*** -7.29*** -7.18*** -7.75*** -7.32*** -6.88*** -7.03***
(1.55) (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) (1.48) (1.49)
Pseudo_R2 0.28 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.21
Countries 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Observations 4208 4208 4208 4208 4208 4208 4208
Chi2 184.01 150.27 164.45 173.01 188.16 183 212.29
AIC 682.02 838.7 833.23 807.67 826.4 765.56 744.97
BIC 777.19 927.52 928.4 909.19 915.23 860.73 846.49
Table A1: Estimating Democratic Transition from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions.  Reference for regime type in Model A1.1 is closed 
authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Logit
Authoritarian 
Failure 
vs. 
Authoritarian 
Survival
Logit
Democratic 
Transition
vs. 
Authoritarian 
Survival
M-Logit
Democratic 
Transition
vs. 
Authoritarian 
Survival
M-Logit
Authoritarian 
Replacement
vs. 
Authoritarian 
Survival
M-Logit
Democratic 
Transition
vs. 
Authoritarian 
Replacement
(A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3) (A2.3) (A2.3)
Electoral Authoritarian 0.67*** 1.15*** 1.19*** -0.29 1.49***
(0.19) (0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.40)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.08 0.22 0.22 -0.23^ 0.46^
(0.09) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.24)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -2.95** -5.00** -5.18** -3.44* -1.74
(1.13) (1.57) (1.60) (1.63) (2.10)
Oil production per capita (t-1) 0.08 -12.93 -12.74 2.10 -14.84
(1.69) (16.87) (17.18) (1.30) (17.33)
Military personnel (per capita) -17.47 -7.41 -11.06 -54.98* 43.93
(12.96) (20.90) (22.50) (23.10) (32.39)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30 0.17
(0.24) (0.46) (0.49) (0.37) (0.62)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) 0.81* 0.59 0.47 0.65 -0.19
(0.36) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.82)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) -0.43* 0.07 0.02 -0.89** 0.91^
(0.20) (0.37) (0.37) (0.33) (0.54)
Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) 0.08** 0.20*** 0.00 0.20*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.53***
(0.15)
Regional Democracy Score (average) 0.08** 0.10** 0.10* 0.08^ 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Age -0.19*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Age (square) 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.12 -5.87*** -6.04*** -0.85 -5.19**
(0.68) (1.40) (1.47) (0.99) (1.77)
Pseudo_R2 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08
Countries 108 108 108 108 108
Observations 4088 4006 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 250.86 135.43 212.84 212.84 212.84
AIC 1866.63 834.54 1825.71 1825.71 1825.71
BIC 1955.05 922.67 2001.99 2001.99 2001.99
Table A2: Estimates with Combined Electoral Authoritarian Dummy
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions.  Reference for regime type is closed 
authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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(A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) (A3.4) (A3.5) (A3.6) (A3.7) (A3.8)
Multiparty Elections 0.06^ 0.18* 0.03 0.07
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11)
Multiparty Elections (square) -0.01^ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Competitive Elections 0.23** 0.77*** 0.18* 1.02***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.30)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.07*** -0.12*
(0.01) (0.06)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.34^ 0.34^ 0.30^ 0.28
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -2.82* -2.98** -3.08** -3.10** -4.40** -4.47** -4.52** -4.57**
(1.13) (1.14) (1.13) (1.16) (1.58) (1.59) (1.57) (1.57)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -0.26 -0.23 -0.47 0.21 -15.33 -15.63 -18.54 -9.98
(1.62) (1.73) (1.90) (1.56) (16.76) (17.38) (19.05) (15.14)
Military personnel (per capita) -19.24 -18.40 -20.77 -24.34^ -17.42 -16.63 -16.87 -24.58
(13.27) (13.06) (13.25) (13.63) (22.40) (22.70) (21.57) (23.85)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.22 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.51)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) 1.05** 0.94** 0.62 0.05 1.18* 1.12* 0.63 -0.42
(0.34) (0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.51) (0.52) (0.60) (0.66)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) -0.36^ -0.38^ -0.39* -0.43* 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.19
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36)
Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.46** 0.47** 0.49** 0.52**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
Regional Democracy Score (average) 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age (square) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -1.05 -1.08 -0.77 -0.80 -6.39*** -6.35*** -5.89*** -5.51***
(0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.73) (1.38) (1.39) (1.34) (1.40)
Pseudo_R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13
Countries 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Observations 4088 4088 4088 4088 4006 4006 4006 4006
Chi2 248.45 257.72 232.50 249.64 111.55 116.03 130.77 126.25
AIC 1883.99 1881.49 1860.66 1828.88 854.90 856.62 847.37 822.88
BIC 1972.41 1976.23 1949.08 1923.62 943.03 951.05 935.51 917.31
Table A3: Alternative Specifications of Elections for Table 1 
Authoritarian Failure Democratic Transition
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A4: Replication of Brownlee (2009)
(A4.1) (A4.2) (A4.3) (A4.4) (A4.5) (A4.6
Electoral Authoritarian 0.65** 1.54*** 1.55***
(0.22) (0.34) (0.35)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 1.28*** 2.40*** 1.80***
(0.23) (0.36) (0.38)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -0.30 0.13 0.86
(0.32) (0.46) (0.63)
Military Regime 1.15*** 1.14*** 2.09*** 2.09*** 0.98* 0.84^
(0.25) (0.26) (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50)
Military-Personal 0.48** 0.54** 1.84*** 2.06*** 1.63* 1.58*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.43) (0.44) (0.71) (0.70)
Party Hybrid -0.51^ -0.50^ -0.79 -0.64 -0.20 -0.32
(0.29) (0.28) (0.65) (0.57) (0.54) (0.53)
Single Party -0.94*** -1.17*** -0.98* -1.50** -0.88 -1.01^
(0.23) (0.24) (0.46) (0.47) (0.54) (0.56)
Military-Personal-Party -1.73** -1.53* -0.56 -0.30
(0.60) (0.75) (0.57) (0.81)
Monarchy -0.58 -0.87* -0.71 -1.58 -0.73 -0.70
(0.41) (0.43) (1.31) (1.69) (1.07) (1.06)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.13 0.13 0.32^ 0.41** 0.27 0.27
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.34) (0.33)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.12 -0.17 0.05 -0.08 0.78* 0.74*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18) (0.32) (0.33)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -4.21*** -4.06** -5.93*** -5.45*** -1.80 -1.68
(1.28) (1.27) (1.51) (1.51) (2.66) (2.76)
Middle East & North Africa -0.12 0.03 -1.04 -0.62 -0.68 -0.78
(0.36) (0.31) (0.92) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86)
Post-Communist Eurasia -0.11 0.06 0.13 0.51 -1.70^ -1.60^
(0.26) (0.27) (0.58) (0.61) (0.89) (0.93)
Age -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Age (square) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-Cold War (1989-2012) 0.00 -0.08 0.78* 0.64* 2.12*** 2.05***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.32) (0.30) (0.53) (0.54)
Constant -2.10** -1.83* -5.73*** -5.12*** -7.47** -7.04**
(0.76) (0.75) (1.25) (1.10) (2.28) (2.34)
Pseudo_R2 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.33
Countries 109.00 109.00 109.00 109.00 90.00 90.00
Observations 4050.00 4050.00 4050.00 4050.00 210.00 210.00
Chi2 139.14 182.10 168.39 244.09 54.57 59.38
AIC 1557.09 1512.65 770.15 719.99 227.99 227.57
BIC 1664.30 1626.16 877.36 833.51 281.55 284.47
Authoritarian Failure Democratic Transition
Democratic Transition 
(limited sample)
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001
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(A5.1) (A5.2) (A5.3) (A5.4) (A5.5) (A5.6)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -1.00^ -0.67
(0.56) (0.59)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 0.70* 1.34**
(0.35) (0.47)
Multiparty Elections 0.02 0.12
(0.23) (0.27)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.00 -0.03
(0.03) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Competitive Elections 1.06** 1.80***
(0.36) (0.51)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.26^ -0.53**
(0.14) (0.19)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.02 0.04*
(0.01) (0.02)
FDI inflows (share of GDP) 2.31^ 2.17 2.19 0.80 0.58 0.86
(1.39) (1.50) (1.39) (3.39) (4.37) (3.44)
Total foreign aid (share of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 0.03 0.13 0.03
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.36) (0.34) (0.36)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -4.08* -4.40* -4.34* -5.05* -5.00* -5.21*
(1.78) (1.75) (1.70) (2.24) (2.25) (2.16)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -18.82 -22.76^ -17.33 -53.64 -61.26 -54.39
(12.98) (12.56) (12.04) (50.84) (40.16) (49.77)
Military personnel (per capita) -42.53 -25.18 -39.44 -87.42^ -73.13 -90.28^
(31.98) (29.93) (32.61) (46.47) (46.55) (49.57)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.24 0.24 0.36 -0.26 -0.21 -0.11
(0.73) (0.66) (0.74) (1.03) (0.96) (1.06)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -0.61 0.12 -0.90 -1.10 0.40 -1.11
(0.76) (0.67) (0.78) (0.94) (0.80) (1.00)
Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) 0.08 0.10 0.11
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Previous Democratic Transitions (count) 0.40 0.42^ 0.42
(0.27) (0.24) (0.27)
Regional Democracy Score (average) 0.09 0.11^ 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Age -0.10* -0.13** -0.12** 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age (square) 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age (cube) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.73 -0.94 -0.59 -2.98 -4.07 -3.19
(2.09) (2.04) (2.13) (2.78) (2.73) (2.87)
Pseudo_R2 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.16
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 1138 1138 1138 1116 1116 1116
AIC 559.38 581.08 567.15 363.09 386.29 366.53
BIC 634.94 661.67 647.75 438.35 466.57 446.81
Authoritarian Failure Democratic Transition
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions.  Reference for regime type in Model A5.1 and 
A5.4 is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A5: Limited Sample with Leverage, 1985-2010
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(A6.1) (A6.2) (A6.3) (A6.4) (A6.5) (A6.6) (A6.7)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -0.65
(0.59)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 1.33**
(0.45)
Multiparty Elections 0.04 -0.03 0.14
(0.07) (0.13) (0.28)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.05)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00
(0.00)
Competitive Elections 0.26** 0.71* 1.73***
(0.08) (0.30) (0.51)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.06 -0.49**
(0.04) (0.19)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.04*
(0.02)
FDI inflows (share of GDP) 1.09 1.07 1.07 0.96 1.27 1.28 1.13
(3.01) (3.66) (3.73) (3.81) (3.51) (3.49) (2.99)
Total foreign aid (share of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.11
(0.38) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -5.46* -5.36* -5.30* -5.37* -5.40* -5.38* -5.58*
(2.31) (2.32) (2.35) (2.34) (2.31) (2.27) (2.24)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -56.68 -73.21 -67.85 -63.88 -64.22 -63.64 -56.58
(53.80) (47.96) (46.05) (42.15) (48.25) (51.60) (51.75)
Military personnel (per capita) -100.21* -86.06^ -87.03^ -87.87^ -91.25^ -100.62^ -102.04*
(47.50) (46.77) (46.76) (47.40) (49.03) (53.16) (50.79)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.06 0.11
(1.06) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99) (1.06) (1.08) (1.10)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -1.31 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.96 -1.44 -1.40
(0.93) (0.77) (0.79) (0.79) (0.87) (0.99) (1.02)
Previous Authoritarian Failures 0.17^ 0.19* 0.18* 0.18* 0.20* 0.19* 0.18^
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Regional Democracy Score 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Time 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -3.85 -4.65^ -4.68^ -4.72^ -3.81 -3.85 -3.90
(2.98) (2.82) (2.83) (2.84) (2.86) (2.90) (3.02)
Pseudo_R2 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116
AIC 555.23 579.05 576.37 579.34 573.76 573.20 567.19
BIC 705.75 719.54 726.90 739.90 714.25 723.72 727.75
Table A6a. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage
Democratic	Transition	vs.	Authoritarian	Survival
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions.  ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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(A6.1) (A6.2) (A6.3) (A6.4) (A6.5) (A6.6) (A6.7)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -1.79^
(1.07)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian -1.32
(0.99)
Multiparty Elections -0.20 -0.88* -1.11
(0.33) (0.44) (0.81)
Multiparty Elections (square) 0.08* 0.15
(0.04) (0.17)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.00
(0.01)
Competitive Elections -0.04 -0.22 -0.99
(0.23) (0.45) (1.00)
Competitive Elections (square) 0.03 0.35
(0.05) (0.32)
Competitive Elections (cube) -0.03
(0.03)
FDI inflows (share of GDP) 4.79*** 4.18*** 4.35*** 4.42*** 4.19** 4.19** 4.36**
(1.17) (1.21) (1.12) (1.15) (1.30) (1.29) (1.35)
Total foreign aid (share of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.21 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.36) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -5.01* -5.09* -5.10* -5.04* -5.12* -5.16* -5.27*
(2.27) (2.16) (2.24) (2.27) (2.14) (2.18) (2.22)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -40.12 -30.63 -39.06 -40.37 -25.29 -26.27 -27.22
(37.16) (28.07) (34.49) (36.35) (24.23) (24.84) (25.93)
Military personnel (per capita) -0.71 1.37 3.60 4.59 2.44 3.84 3.68
(52.49) (49.05) (53.88) (54.02) (45.55) (45.14) (45.75)
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.40 1.13 1.37 1.36 1.15 1.22 1.25
(1.11) (1.00) (1.16) (1.16) (1.02) (1.06) (1.06)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -0.16 -0.43 -0.01 0.04 -0.78 -0.66 -0.66
(1.47) (1.42) (1.44) (1.40) (1.48) (1.51) (1.45)
Previous Authoritarian Failures -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Regional Democracy Score 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Time 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.09
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -6.07* -5.65 -6.69^ -6.63^ -4.57 -4.73 -4.83
(3.07) (3.77) (3.64) (3.55) (3.24) (3.32) (3.18)
Pseudo_R2 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116
AIC 555.23 579.05 576.37 579.34 573.76 573.20 567.19
BIC 705.75 719.54 726.90 739.90 714.25 723.72 727.75
Table A6b. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage
Authoritarian	Replacement	vs.	Authoritarian	Survival
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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(A6.1) (A6.2) (A6.3) (A6.4) (A6.5) (A6.6) (A6.7)
Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 1.14
(1.12)
Competitive Electoral Authoritarian 2.65*
(1.09)
Multiparty Elections 0.24 0.85^ 1.26
(0.34) (0.44) (0.79)
Multiparty Elections (square) -0.07^ -0.18
(0.04) (0.16)
Multiparty Elections (cube) 0.01
(0.01)
Competitive Elections 0.30 0.93 2.72*
(0.26) (0.57) (1.11)
Competitive Elections (square) -0.09 -0.85*
(0.07) (0.38)
Competitive Elections (cube) 0.07*
(0.03)
FDI inflows (share of GDP) -3.71 -3.10 -3.28 -3.46 -2.92 -2.91 -3.24
(3.10) (3.96) (3.95) (4.01) (3.85) (3.81) (3.33)
Total foreign aid (share of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita (log, t-1) -0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.12
(0.54) (0.60) (0.59) (0.58) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54)
GDP per capita growth (t-1) -0.46 -0.27 -0.19 -0.34 -0.28 -0.22 -0.32
(2.59) (2.66) (2.67) (2.68) (2.60) (2.63) (2.59)
Oil production per capita (t-1) -16.56 -42.58 -28.79 -23.51 -38.93 -37.37 -29.36
(65.40) (57.22) (58.89) (56.63) (55.59) (58.96) (59.56)
Military personnel (per capita) -99.51 -87.43 -90.63 -92.46 -93.69 -104.46 -105.72
(72.95) (71.93) (76.24) (76.80) (69.49) (72.46) (69.91)
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.47 -1.17 -1.43 -1.41 -0.99 -1.16 -1.14
(1.51) (1.42) (1.56) (1.55) (1.49) (1.52) (1.51)
Civil Society Participation (t-5) -1.15 0.41 0.08 0.00 -0.18 -0.78 -0.74
(1.73) (1.62) (1.60) (1.56) (1.75) (1.85) (1.80)
Previous Authoritarian Failures 0.31^ 0.31^ 0.32^ 0.33^ 0.31^ 0.30^ 0.27
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Regional Democracy Score -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Time -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Time-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time-Cubed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 2.21 1.00 2.01 1.91 0.76 0.88 0.93
(4.37) (4.88) (4.76) (4.69) (4.49) (4.59) (4.55)
Pseudo_R2 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116
AIC 555.23 579.05 576.37 579.34 573.76 573.20 567.19
BIC 705.75 719.54 726.90 739.90 714.25 723.72 727.75
Table A6c. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage
Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Replacement
Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions.  ^ p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
